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4.1  Introduction 
The Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) and the countries 
belonging to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
recorded an economic growth rate of 6%  10% during the 197Os, a rate 
matched by no other group of countries in the world. Japan’s growth 
rate of  5.2% during  1976-80,  while much higher than that of other 
developed countries, fell far short of the growth performance of her 
Asian neighbors. 
The rapid growth of the Asian NICs and ASEAN countries in the 
1970s has been outward-looking, based on the rapid expansion of pro- 
duction and exports of manufactured goods, whose ultimate destination 
has been predominantly the developed countries. North America and 
Western Europe absorbed 37% and 23% respectively of the industrial 
exports from the NICs during the years 1969-79. They also absorbed 
25%  and 21% of those from ASEAN. Japan’s share of the industrial 
exports from the NICs was 11%, and its share from ASEAN was 8%. 
After the second oil  shock, however, developed-country  markets 
were depressed considerably in 1981 and 1982, and the export growth 
of the NICs and ASEAN decelerated. They each suffered from foreign 
exchange shortages and were forced to slow down their development 
programs, resulting  in their economic growth rate dropping by  2-5 
percentage points. Economic recovery began in early 1983, originating 
from the revived import expansion of the United States. It is likely 
that the industrial exports from the NICs and ASEAN will continue to 
flow into the developed-country markets. This reflects the basic com- 
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plementarity of the industrial structures of the two groups; however, 
the trade pattern involved presents some problems. 
First, the growth of the economies of the NICs and ASEAN will be 
disrupted again by a setback to developed-country economies.  Sec- 
ondly, growth of their exports to those markets will be limited in the 
long run, because the growth of those markets, especially that of West- 
ern Europe, has decelerated  and the recent expansion of  the NICs’ 
exports has aggravated the adjustment difficulty of import-competing 
industries there and has provoked import restriction. Diversification of 
their export markets  is desirable to avoid the vulnerability  of  their 
exports in both the short and the long run. During the 1970s the number 
of  their  export markets  was  expanded  to include the Middle  East, 
Japan, and China, but considering the growth potential of the NICs 
and ASEAN countries, their own markets deserve more attention as 
promising demand sources. 
It is often suggested that Japan should absorb more industrial exports 
from the NICs and ASEAN countries. If primary products are included, 
Japan has absorbed 27% of the ASEAN exports, far exceeding the 
absorption by North American (18%) and Western Europe (16%). But 
her importation of industrial products from the NICs and ASEAN still 
remains a smaller share, and the possibility of its expansion is yet to 
be explored. 
This paper examines Japan’s economic relationship with the Asian 
NICs and ASEAN  countries from a global perspective.’  The trade 
matrices in tables 4.1-4.3  show the trade flows of Japan, the Asian 
NICs, and the ASEAN countries, both among themselves and with the 
rest of the world, at three different levels of commodity aggregation- 
all commodities, industrial goods, and textiles and clothing. Singapore 
is duly regarded as a NIC given its stage of industrial development, 
but in our analysis it is included in the ASEAN group because of  the 
effect of geographical location on its trade pattern. 
Although primary  commodities still composed 75% of Japan’s im- 
ports, 36% of the NICs’ imports, and 74% of ASEAN exports in 1979, 
it is industrial goods trade that receives attention in this paper.  The 
catching up of the NICs and ASEAN has been most prominent in the 
production and export of textiles and clothing. 
The trade of Mainland China is represented as an independent entry 
in our trade matrices.  It absorbed 3.6% of Japan’s industrial goods 
exports and supplied 11.7% of Japan’s textile and clothing imports in 
1979. It is widely anticipated that Japan will be further involved in trade 
and other forms of international division of labor with China in the 
1980s. But the unpredictability of China’s future course confines our 
discussion to Japan’s relationship with her Asian neighbors  that are 
characterized by a market economy system. 95  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
4.2  The Spread of Industrialization 
In the Far East industrialization has spread sequentially from Japan 
to the NICs and finally to the ASEAN countries. Changes in the com- 
parative advantage structure of individual countries have corresponded 
to the spread of industrialization. 
Let us give a brief overview. In the prewar period, Japan was the 
only industrialized country in the region, and the trade pattern was a 
simple complementary manufactures/primary commodities exchange 
between Japan and other countries. The present-day NICs completed 
import substitution of light manufactures in the 1950s and started ex- 
porting them to the United States and Europe in the 1960s. There then 
emerged a competitive aspect to the trade relations between the NICs 
and Japan and a complementary relationship between the NICs and 
ASEAN.  Following this new development, the 1970s saw the devel- 
opment of ASEAN light industrialization and the start of a competitive 
relationship between ASEAN and the NICs. The NICs, in turn, pro- 
ceeded with heavy industrialization and in some commodities began to 
compete with Japan. 
It should not be ignored that at present Japan still supplies heavy 
industrial products, such as capital and intermediate goods, on a large 
scale to these countries, and about 80% of ASEAN exports consist of 
primary commodities. There is a growing tendency in Japan, however, 
to import from the NICs and ASEAN low-price light manufactures 
instead of producing them domestically; this is expected to continue. 
Therefore, in  summary, the present trade relationship among Japan, 
the NICs, and ASEAN is a complex structure consisting of both com- 
petitive and complementary elements. This of course reflects the eco- 
nomic differences among the three groups, such as their varying levels 
of industrialization and the different sizes of their domestic markets. 
The achievement of industrial development and trade expansion by 
the Asian NICs and ASEAN countries can be attributed to the activities 
of the private  sector. Direct investment by US. and Japanese firms 
and technology transfer through their activities played an important 
role in the spreading of industrialization to the present NICs and the 
ASEAN countries. Leading local enterprises have evolved in response 
to the growth of demand both at home and abroad. The commercial 
activities of overseas Chinese also had a role in creating the division 
of labor within the region. 
However, government policies of both the NICs and the ASEAN 
countries have affected private business activities and are partly re- 
sponsible for the present structure of extra- and intraregional trade. 
Foreign investment and protection policies of the governments of the 
NICs and the ASEAN  countries contributed  by paving the way for 96  Ippei Yamazawa 
Table 4.1  Trade Matrix of All Commodities,  1969 and 1979 (millions of  U.S. 
$) 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7. 
1.  Japan  606*  767*  615  313*  138*  434 
4,365  6,245  3,675  2,665  1,506  1,714 
2.  Taiwan  158*  22*  93*  26*  9*  27* 
2,260  171  1,131  422  130  185 
3,352  160  53  1  197  86  110 
4.  Hong Kong  141  35  18  90  26  26 
530  185  41  282  86  64 
3.  Korea  133*  13*  24*  12*  2*  6* 




8. Philippines  337 
1,201 
7,192 
6.  Malaysia  305* 
7.  Thailand  153* 






















47*  85* 
96 1  2,037 
18*  352 
188  1,931 
56  57*  55 
247  427  228 
8*  5*  I* 
158  66  57 
7*  141*  50 










10. South Asia 
11. AustralidNew 
12.  North America 
Zealand 
13. Western Europe 
14.  Middle East 
15. China 
16.  Rest of  the world 
17.  World total 
331*  2* 
3,426  209 
1,160  36* 
5,849  409 
4,040  333* 
20,695  3,239 
1,340*  99* 
8,328  1,313 
1,730*  a* 
27,563  1,900 
245*  - 
2,968  - 
2,055  29* 
7,887  688 
12,490*  1,215* 
96,318  13,305 
8*  55  45  6* 
237  276  168  71 
16*  64  84  73* 
570  377  486  442 
506*  375  154*  71* 
4,153  2,106  2,333  981 
198*  553  278*  231 
2,073  3,163  2,218  1,349 
2,863  95  3,399  606 
-  *  401*  123  72 
5  2,719  370  199 
3*  66*  48*  12* 
90 1  673  416  263 
1,642*  2,425*  1,729*  878* 
24*  44  4*  46* 

















Sources: Institute of Developing Economies, Computerized Trade Statistics Search Sys- 
tem (AIDXT) (Tokyo), supplemented by United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
(New York), and individual country trade statistics. See Yamazawa, Hirata, and Taniguchi 
1983 for details of  the compilation. 
Notes: The numbers making up the headings  across the top of the table indicate the 
importing countries and regions.  In the body of the table, the upper figure indicates the 97  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15.  16.  17. 
476  237*  184*  579  5,498  2,052*  207*  391*  3,495  15,990* 
1,620  2,124  2,189  3,191  28,336  16,524  9,610  4,115  15,154  103,032 
15*  13*  I*  16*  440*  104*  7*  -  118*  1,050* 
I*  2*  I*  6*  327*  55*  2*  -  37s  623* 
201  399  61  448  6,092  2,306  902  -  1,370  16,078 
109  195  248  181  4,777  2,841  1,366  -  900  15,052 
17*  62  11  72  827  557*  23*  6*  266  2,178 
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1,311  873*  6,329  4,500  47,740  123,510  7,090*  2,550*  57,210  272,560 
6,634  7,397  22,935  20,546  250,747  738,474  77,326  17,561  320,119  1,638,302 
trade value (f.0.b.)  in 1969 and the lower figure the value in 1979. * = the growth rate is higher than 
the world average; a = the trade value is less than U.S.  $1 million; -  = no record in the basic data. 
The years 1969 and 1979 were chosen in order to highlight the increase in world export. Since 1979 
was a peak year before the adverse effects of the second oil shock emerged, the 1969-79  period will 
reveal the fastest growth in world export. 98  Ippei Yamazawa 
Table 4.2  Trade Matrix of All Industrial Goods, 1969 and 1979 
(millions of  U.S. $) 
I.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7. 
1.  Japan  561*  584*  569*  294*  132*  422 
4,056  5,787  3,450  2,576  1,453  1,652 
2.  Taiwan  31*  2*  76*  19*  7*  25* 
1,379  94  1,052  387  122  156 
3.  Korea  57*  8*  20*  11*  1*  5* 
2,360  122  484  182  83  104 
4.  Hong Kong  96  25*  16  73  18  22 
421  173  35  24 1  72  46 
5.  Singapore  3*  I*  1*  15* 
248  52  43  328 
*  6.  Malaysia  87  -  I*  4* 
7.  Thailand  8*  U*  a*  3* 
8.  Philippines  3*  1*  a*  2* 
377  28  52  137 
215  6  13  98 
155  19  10  115 
114  3  a  43 






4*  1* 
163  37 
1*  1* 
22  16 
108  I* 









10.  South Asia  58*  a*  5  37  26  2*  9 
592  34  18  193  57  49  32 
1 1.  AustralidNew  93  10*  U*  34*  27*  29  18 
Zealand  520  123  62  230  281  123  105 
12.  North America  1,657  200*  198*  292  132*  53* 
13.  Western Europe  1,148  88*  193*  494  239*  193* 
14. Middle East  30*  a*  2*  34  3  8 
425  48  28  19  3  6 
7,519  1,844  1,872  1,574  2,146  873 




,08  1 
13 
I* 
15.  China  51*  -  -  *  169*  73  30  -* 
16.  Rest of the world  595  1*  I*  9*  2*  1*  1* 
700  -  3  1,470  216  71  61 
2,359  73  448  427  164  55  14 
17.  World total  3,920*  895*  1,005*  1,757*  1,045*  507*  888 
24,098  7,756  10,406  12,544  9,072  5,539  4,281 
Sources: Institute of Developing Economies, Computerized Trade Statistics Search Sys- 
tem (AIDXT) (Tokyo), supplemented by United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
(New York), and individual country trade statistics. See Yamazawa, Hirata, and Taniguchi 
1983 for details of the compilation. 
Nores: The numbers making up the headings across the top of  the table indicate the 
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8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15.  16.  17. 
432 
1,532 
226*  174*  548 







12*  I*  15* 
266  45  432 
2*  I*  5* 
176  237  173 
58  10  66* 
41  47  410 
5,273  1,848* 
27,679  15,866 
387*  46* 
306*  33* 
815  542* 
5,903  2,105 
4,595  2,673 
4,001  3,879 
198*  382*  3,328  14,970* 
9,345  3,587  15,086  99,041 
6*  -  95  *  734* 
I*  -  29*  479* 
657  -  1,304  14,077 
1,287  -  843  13,428 
22*  2*  234  2,01015 





































38*  22* 
153*  49* 
99  1  686 
63  29* 
357  599 
43  *  4* 
430  146 
21  34* 
23  23 1 













*  - 
2 
*  - 
11 
2 




















































53*  46 
1,666  208 
13*  192 
180  970 
273  919 
1,426  3,970 
632*  1,672 
5,140  5,395 
228  31 
28*  30 
212  171 
2,265  37* 
1,176  269 





3,466  3,550 
12,632  15,487 
329  314*  50*  2*  472 
1,171  3,021  1,063  326  655 
180  210  2*  5*  213 
525  807  72  218  87  1 
14,257  8,626  422*  a*  7,740 
49,631  34,590  7,265  758  31,582 
10,104  57,876*  1,545*  427*  17,825 
39,829  357,792  29,303  3,616  85,143 
151  251*  6*  U*  127 
108  1,585  2,406  21  67  1 
460  1,126  509  2,382 
1,267*  6,819  2,805  771  9,989* 
8,643  23,752  3,948  3,248  62,415 
33,400  76,850  5,065*  1,590*  40,284 
145,878  449,914  56,976  12,000  202,523 

















trade value (f.0.b.) in 1969 and the lower figure the value in 1979. Industrial goods represent SITC 
sections  5-8.  *  =  the  growth  rate  is  higher  than  the  world  average; 
a = the trade value is less than U.S. $1 million; -  = no record in the basic data. The years 1969 
and 1979 were chosen in order to highlight the increase in world export. Since 1979 was a peak 
year before the adverse effects of the second oil shock emerged, the  1969-79  period will reveal 
the fastest growth in world export. 100  Ippei Yamazawa 
Table 4.3  Trade Matrix of Textiles and Clothing 1969 and 1979 
(millions of  U.S. $) 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7. 
1.  Japan  51  103  220  107  11  47 
140  296  568  173  41  47 
____ 
2.  Taiwan  10*  a*  39*  10*  I*  7 
449  23  473  128  30  18 
3.  Korea  36*  a*  1 I*  9*  I*  3 
1,242  41  204  85  14  17 
4.  Hong Kong  II*  6  I*  26  7  3* 
188  23  15  90  20  18 
5.  Singapore 














a*  a* 
2  3 
a  -* 
a  2 
a*  U* 
2  3 
a  -* 
U  U 
U  - 



























*  - 
a 
10.  South Asia 
11. AustralidNew 
12. North America 
Zealand 
13. Western Europe 
14.  Middle East 
15. China 


































































































17.  World total  198*  62  109  462  235  45  71 
3,627  347  402  2,533  791  258  135 
Sources: Institute of Developing Economies, Computerized Trade Statistics Search Sys- 
tem (AIDXT) (Tokyo), supplemented by United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics 
(New York), and individual country trade statistics. See Yamazawa, Hirata, and Taniguchi 
1983 for details of the compilation. 
Notes: The numbers making  up the headings across the top of  the table indicate the 
importing countries and regions. In the body of  the table, the upper figure indicates the 101  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15.  16.  17. 
44  27  21*  118  635  147  57*  14*  495  2,097 
77  88  174  215  593  328  430  112  1,060  4,343 
3*  4*  a*  8*  114*  24*  4*  -  38*  263* 
46  54  16  115  1,121  488  134  -  440  3,535 
11  27  63  71  1,234  1,106  170  -  378  4,664 
1*  22  6  40  318  319*  6*  a*  108  874 
52  6  29  201  1,681  2,055  162  41  247  4,829 






*  - 
*  - 
1 
4  2* 
2  79 
a  a* 
1  3 
2  -* 
4  20 
a  -* 
a  a 










































































































































































































73  111  83*  412  2,614  7,923  256*  27*  3,037  15,720 
256  211  873  1,586  9,061  46,958  4,123  449  12,310  83,921 
trade value (f.0.b.) in  1969 and the lower figure the value in  1979. Textiles represent 
SITC sections 65 and 84. * = the growth rate is higher than the world average; a = the 
trade value is less than U.S. $1 million; -  = no record in the basic data. The years 
1969 and 1979 were chosen in order to highlight the increase in world export. Since 1979 
was a peak year before the adverse effects of the second oil shock emerged, the 1969- 
79 period will reveal the fastest growth in world export. 102  Ippei Yamazawa 
industrialization. The change of their development  strategy from an 
inward- to an outward-looking one has accelerated the export expan- 
sion of manufactures from these countries. However, it has tended to 
increase the extraregional concentration of their exports while leaving 
their intraregional division of labor lagging behind. 
4.3  Competition with the NICs and ASEAN in the Export Market 
Japan trades with the global market, and her trade with the NICs 
and ASEAN represents only slightly more than one-fifth of her total 
exports and imports. These statistics, however, underestimate Japan’s 
close competitivekomplementary relations with these countries. Com- 
petition between their products has been occurring more often in third- 
country markets than in their own. 
In table 4.4 the trade matrices of tables 4.1-4.3  are rearranged to 
illustrate competition among Japan, the NICs,  and ASEAN  in their 
major export markets.  For all industrial goods, each of the three in- 
creased its share in both North America and Western Europe. Although 
Japan still retains much larger shares, the NICS and the ASEAN coun- 
tries more than doubled their shares. In the NICs’ and ASEAN markets 
the decline of Japanese shares was matched by increases in the NICs’ 
and ASEAN shares. In textile competition this is more visible. While 
Japan lost half of its shares in all markets, the NICs gained an amount 
equal to the Japanese loss. It is clear that textile exports from the NICs 
and the ASEAN countries were very competitive with Japan’s products 
and succeeded in replacing them at the low-quality end of the product 
line. 
4.4  Japan’s Industrial Imports from the NICs and ASEAN 
Japanese imports of manufactures from the NICs and ASEAN coun- 
tries started in the late 1950s but reached a significant level only in the 
latter half of the 1970s. The basic reason for the recent increase is the 
rise in wage costs in Japan, but the following factors also contributed 
to Japan’s import expansion: (1) substantial tariff cuts in  1967-72  in 
the Kennedy Round, the Unilateral Tariff Reduction, and the Gener- 
alized  System of  Preferences  to developing-country exports; (2) re- 
peated, rapid yen appreciation during the 1970s; (3) some products of 
Japanese multinational companies and procurements by government 
trading companies flowed back  to Japan (boomerang phenomenon); 
and (4) the NICs’ efforts to diversify their export markets to the Middle 
East and Japan in response to the rise of protectionism in the United 
States and Western Europe. 103  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
Table 4.2 shows that Japan’s imports of manufactures rose sixfold, 
from $4 billion in 1969 to $24 billion in 1979. Especially notable in this 
is the rise of the NICs’ share. Textile imports, according to table 4.4, 
show an even more sharp increase and in value terms increased eigh- 
teen times in the same period; more than half of it from the NICs. The 
share of imports from ASEAN countries shows a rising trend but is 
still  small. Japan’s imports  of  textiles from the NICs  and  ASEAN 
became comparable in size to those of the United States and Western 
Europe combined, although Japan imports much more from Korea and 
Taiwan than from the others. 
Detailed analysis of individual commodity items will be worthwhile. 
The combined share of  the NICs and ASEAN in Japan’s manufac- 
tured imports averaged 22% in 1979, but many individual commodity 
items exceeded this figure. Table 4.5 lists the twenty groups (out of 
102 SITC three-digit  level categories) in which the Asian NICs and 
ASEAN countries held the largest shares of Japan’s import market, 
in  order  of  the  size of  the  share.  More  than  half  of  the Japanese 
imports in these twenty  categories were  supplied  by  the NICs and 
ASEAN  countries.  Tin  (concentrates and metal) has  been  included 
in  the table although  it  may  be  classified as a primary commodity. 
Cement, watches, radios and televisions, and five products from SITC 
division  67  (iron  and  steel) are  new  exports  which  had  only  very 
small shares, if  any, in the  1960s but grew to be major export com- 
modities  of  these countries  in  the  1970s. The last three columns of 
the table identify the major exporters and their shares. It is remark- 
able that for seventeen commodities either Korea or Taiwan held the 
largest share, followed by Hong Kong, which led in two items (see 
table 4.5). On the other hand,  the ASEAN countries  had  shares of 
more than 5% only in eight commodity groups (textiles, miscellaneous 
products, and indigenous products; see table 4.6). 
4.5  Japan’s Exports of  Intermediate and Investment Goods to the 
NICs and MEAN 
An examination of the competitive aspect of trade does not tell the 
whole story. Although the NICs, and to a lesser degree the ASEAN 
countries, have substantially increased their exports of consumer goods, 
they cannot yet domestically supply many needed intermediate  and 
investment goods and have to import them from Japan and other de- 
veloped countries. Every aspect of competition and complementarity 
in trade relations can be observed in trade matrices, in the change of 
market shares, and in the expansion of imports. But the coexistence 
of both can be established only with an international input-output table. 
An international 1/0 table has been completed recently by the In- 
stitute of Developing Economies, Japan. It links the I/O tables of Japan, Table 4.4  Competition in Major Markets  (millions of  U.S. $) 
Importing Country 
Australia 
North  Western  and  Middle 
Japan  NICs  ASEAN  America  Europe  N. 2.  East 
All Commodities 
37.6  27.3  11.5  1.7 
29.8  20.8  11.3  2.2 
3.5  3.9  5.7  3.3  0.6 
6.4  4.6  5.7  6.0  1.2 
9.3  5.2  16.2  2.5  0.7 
14.0  7.3  24.2  3.7  1.1 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Total  (1  2,490)  (5,28  1)  (5,860)  (47,740)  (123,510) 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 






















































































































Textiles and Clothing 
44.1  24.  I  1.9 
25.8  6.5  0.7 
18.3  21.1  4.6 
37.4  44.5  7.8 
2.8  0.9  0.1 
14.1  4.0  1.4 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
(535)  (2,614)  (7,923) 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 





















Source: Tables 4.1-4.3. 
Note: See notes to table 4.1. Table 4.5  Japan’s Imports of Manufactured Goods from Asian NICs and ASEAN 
SITC 
Code 
No.  Commodity 
~~ 
Eight Countries’ 
Japan’s Total  Combined Share 
Imports 
1979  1979  1970  Individual Countries’ Share 





85  1 
673 
84  1 
65  I 
693 
82  1 
Tin 
Iron and steel castings 
Wood manufactures 
Iron and steel plates 
Footwear 
Iron and steel bars 
Clothing 
Textile yarn and thread 

































KR  (57.1) 
TW (55.6) 
PH  (3.5) 
KR  (41.4) 
KR  (42.0) 
KR  (39.4) 
KR  (39.6) 
PH  (1.1) 
KR  (45.7) 
KR  (54.5) 
TW (40.2) 
TH  (2.6) 
SP  (1.0) 











PH  (2.2) 
TH  (19.7) 
KP  (6.8) 
SP  (1.0) 
HK  (5.7) 
HK  (2.6) 
HK (2.3) 
HK  (6.4) 










Cement and building materials 
Iron and steel wire 
Mineral tar 
Other manufactured articles 
Fur clothing 
Watches and clocks 
Tulle, lace, embroidery, etc. 
Ingots of  steel 
Manufactures of leather 































KR  (47.8) 
KR  (55.8) 
KR  (56.8) 
TW  (26.6) 
PH  (2.1) 
HK (49.9) 
HK (20.5) 
KR  (6.2) 
KR  (43.6) 
TW (25.4) 
KR  (39.0) 
TW  (23.2) 
SP  (3.3) 
TW  (11.6) 
TW (2.0) 
KR  (14.5)  HK  (8.6) 
IN  (1.8)  ML (1.4) 
KR  (5.5) 
TW  (9.7)  SP  (7.2) 
PH  (5.9) 
TW  (3.9) 
KR  (21.6) 
TW  (6.2) 
KR  (15.6)  HK  (2.4) 
Total (20 items)  4,999,265 
~ 
Source: Compiled and computed by H. Kohama using the AIDXT program of the Institute of Developing Economies. 
Notes: All percentages in parentheses indicate the proportions of Japan’s total imports from individual countries. KR = Republic 
of  Korea; TW  = Taiwan; HK = Hong Kong; SP = Singapore; ML = Malaysia; TH = Thailand; PH  = Philippines; IN = 
Indonesia. 108  Ippei Yamazawa 
Table 4.6  Japan’s Other Major Imports from MEAN 











Materials of rubber 
Made-up textile articles 












Source: Compiled and computed by H. Kohama using the AIDXT program of the institute 
of Developing Economies. 
Notes:  Percentages indicate  the proportions of  Japan’s  total  imports from individual 
countries. 
SP = Singapore; ML = Malaysia; TH = Thailand; PH = Philippines. 
the United States, Korea, and the five ASEAN countries by means of 
trade matrices and enables us to trace both direct and indirect effects 
of an increase in a country’s final demand on the trade and production 
of all countries. 
Table 4.7 is an excerpt from the inverse matrix computed from the 
international 110 table (IDE 1982). It gives the induced manufacturing 
output generated by a million U.S. dollar increase of  final demand for 
the manufacturing output in each country. It includes the expansion of 
manufacturing output both directly and indirectly required for induced 
export expansion. 
For example, a million dollar increase in demand for manufacturing 
output from Indonesia induces the expansion of  manufacturing output 
not only in Indonesia but also in other countries (in the form of imports). 
It includes both direct inducement of the product demand and indirect 
inducement of intermediate input into the production. It amounts to a 
$1,155,300 increase in manufacturing output for Indonesia, $600 for 
Malaysia, and so on. The induced manufacturing output for the other 
seven countries combined totals $13 1,900  and that for all eight countries 
totals $1,287,200. 
Even with constant exogenous demand for each individual country, 
the different composition of  final output of each country, that is, the 
different structure of production of intermediate inputs, results in dif- 
ferent amounts of induced expansion of output. Japan has the largest 
amount of  induced domestic output,  $1,782,000, reflecting the high 
degree of intermediate production characteristic of her industrial struc- 
ture. On the other hand, induced expansion of foreign output reflects 109  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
Table 4.7  Interdependence of Manufacturing Production among Asia-Pacific 
Countries: Output Induced by $1 Million Increase in Demand for 
Manufacturing Output in  the Importing Country (thousands of U.S. $) 
Exporting Country 
Importing 
Country  Ind.  Mal.  Phil.  Sing.  Thai.  Korea  Japan  U.S. 
Indonesia  1,155.3  1.0  0.2  27.2  0.2  1.2  1.1  0.2 
Malaysia  0.6  1,219.1  0.4  26.1  0.8  5.4  0.8  0.7 
Philippines  0.3  0.3  1,257.5  0.9  0.4  1.1  2.0  0.5 
Singapore  9.0  16.0  0.4  1,210.2  1.9  0.5  1.0  0.4 
Thailand  0.6  6.0  0.3  4.7  1,277.2  1.3  1.6  0.2 
Korea  1.7  1.5  0.8  3.9  2.3  1,459.1  2.5  1.2 
Japan  97.2  65.0  71.1  122.8  82.9  143.4  1,782.0  16.6 
U.S.  17.1  25.1  36.6  67.9  11.2  69.2  22.0  1,626.2 
Total induced 
output abroad  131.9  114.9  109.8  253.5  99.7  222.1  31.0  19.8 
Total induced 
output both 
at home and 
abroad  1,287.2  1,334.0  1,367.3  1,463.7  1,376.9  1,681.2  1,813.0  1,646.0 
Source: Rearranged from the inverse matrix of the twenty-four-sector  international  1-0 table 
(Institute of Developing Economies 1982). 
import dependence. Singapore has the highest figure, $253,500 in output 
induced abroad per million dollars of exogenous demand in Singapore. 
A detailed examination of the table establishes the unique role of 
Japan in providing Korea and ASEAN countries with the intermediate 
inputs needed for their manufacturing production. The induced expan- 
sion for Japan is  on the order of  U.S.  $70-$140  thousand and far 
exceeds those for other countries, which are on the order of  $200- 
$2,000 except in the case of Singapore, with its closer ties to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand ($2-$26  thousand). 
Let us take as  an example the Japan-Korea relationship. The re- 
placement of a million dollars’ worth of Japanese products by Korean 
ones (a million dollar increase in Korean exports and a corresponding 
decrease of Japanese exports, say, to North America) generates $140 
thousand in Japanese output, resulting in a net $840 thousand decrease 
in Japan’s manufacturing output. The figure $140 thousand is the in- 
duced effect for all manufacturing on average, but the amount is much 
larger for some manufactures ($290 thousand for textiles, $400 thou- 
sand for machinery, and $530 thousand for metals) because the inter- 
mediate inputs needed for such heavy manufacturing are less available 
at home.2 110  Ippei Yamazawa 
How will further heavy industrialization of Korean industry affect 
this complementary relationship with Japan? Indeed, the import sub- 
stitution in the heavy industries would reduce complementarity; how- 
ever, since Korea cannot promote heavy industrialization in many prod- 
uct lines at the same time because of its limited market and capacity 
size, it is more likely that Korean heavy industrialization will increase 
both complementarity and competition with Japan. A similar compe- 
titionkomplementarity relationship exists between the ASEAN coun- 
tries and Japan, although to a lesser extent. 
Japan’s export growth continued at a reasonable speed in the latter 
half of  the 1970s. Partly, this was because of the steady export expan- 
sion of automobiles, electronics, machinery, etc., to the major markets 
of the United States and Europe and to the new market of the Middle 
East. Industrialization in the NICs and the ASEAN countries, on the 
other hand, through its inducement effect, promoted Japan’s export of 
intermediate and investment goods to these countries. 
Incidentally, the intermediate induced expansion to Korea and Sin- 
gapore from the other four ASEAN countries  reflects  the emerging 
dependence of  the latter on the former for the supply of intermediate 
and investment  goods.  It is presumed  that this dependence has in- 
creased since 1975, considering the recent export expansion of those 
commodities from Korea and Singapore. 
4.6  Japan’s Trade Balance with the NICs and ASEAN 
The trade matrix of all commodities (table 4.1) shows the regional 
structure of the balance of trade. Comparison of figures in the cells at 
symmetrical positions using the diagonal line as an axis enables us to 
obtain each country or region’s balance of trade with others. Table 4.8 
provides data on the balance of trade for Japan, the Asian NICs, and 
the ASEAN countries. Japan and the Asian NICs together, all of which 
are industrial goods exporters, incur deficits with such resource-rich 
countries as Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle East, and 
maintain trade surpluses with North America and Western Europe. And 
all Asian NICs and the less-resource-rich ASEAN countries (Thailand 
and the Philippines) incur big trade deficits with Japan, offsetting much 
of  their  surplus with  other countries, from which  stem the present 
complaints of these countries against Japan. It goes without saying that 
individual bilateral trade should not necessarily be balanced in a world 
of multilateral trade. So long as Japan imports raw materials and exports 
in processed form, a surplus in industrial goods trade is needed to pay 
for her imports of  primary products. 
However, Japan experienced big  surpluses in  current accounts in 
1977-78  and 1981-83.  The surplus of U.S. $27.5 billion in  1977 -78 111  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
Table 4.8  Regional Structure of  the Balance of Trade, 1969 and 1979 
(millions of U.S.  $) 
Trade Balance with 
Austr. 
Asian  and  North  Western 
World  Japan  NICs  ASEAN  N.Z.  America  Europe 
Japan  +3,500  +  1,556  +441  -581  +1,458  +712 
Asian NICs  +6,714  +8,143  -3,831  -2,658  +7,641  +8,196 
Taiwan  -165  -448  +  67 
+2,773  -2,105  +957 
Korea  -1,019  -634  -3 
-3,224  -2,893  +479 
Hong Kong  -247  -474  -64 
-5,239  -3,145  -1,436 
-1,431  -1,556  0 
Total  -5,690  -8,143  0 
+  28  -  20  + 107  +5 
+  500  +39  +2,853  +993 
-  56  -  10  -179  -143 
-320  -389  +624  +768 
+  85  +8  +  452  +4 
-  1,064  +40  + 1,973  +752 
+  57  -  22  +380  -  134 
-884  -310  +5,450  +2,513 
ASEAN 
Singapore  -180  -203  -60  -  870  -  34  +  32  -  23 
-3,110  -1,300  +402  -1,024  +232  -  245  -9 
Malaysia  +772  + 167  + 18  +213  -  23  +  203  +  62 
+2,961  +1,084  +288  +45  -178  + 1,007  +784 
Thailand  -361  -281  +  29  +  48  -  27  -51  -  143 
-  1,608  -602  +2  +41  -  99  -301  + 155 
Philippines  -488  -  139  + 16  -  48  -  62  -70  -175 
-2,033  -419  -  65  -343  -154  -  173  +  27 
Indonesia  -  73  + 15  -  60  + 175  +  35  -81  ~  69 
+8,193  +5,068  +257  +1,281  -90  +2,178  -  74 
Total  -330  -441  -  57  0  -111  +33  -348 
+4,403  +3,831  +884  0  -289  +2,466  +883 
Source: Rearranged from table 4.1. 
Note: The upper figures are for 1969 and the lower for 1979. 
was resolved through various channels, partly through the appreciation 
of the yen, partly through capital outflow, partly by means of  expan- 
sionary monetary and fiscal policies, and finally by the second oil price 
hike.  The surplus of  U.S. $32.4 billion in  1981-83  has not yet been 
followed by the appreciation of the yen but has been matched mainly 
by short-term capital outflow in response to higher interest rates in the 
United States. Capital flow of a longer-term nature (direct investment, 
long-term export credit, etc.) has also contributed to the capital account 
deficit, which offset the big current account surplus. Furthermore, fiscal 112  Ippei Yamazawa 
and monetary expansion has been implemented, though insufficiently, 
being constrained by the accumulation of government debt and the fear 
of further depreciation of the yen. 
Because of Japan’s increasing surplus in her overall current account, 
complaints about trade with Japan have been leveled by the United 
States and the European Economic Community as well as by her Asian 
neighbors, all of them demanding the “opening of the Japanese market” 
to their products. However, Japan’s overall imbalance should be dis- 
tinguished from her bilateral trade imbalance with her Asian neighbors. 
The overall imbalance itself needs to be resolved by proper macro- 
economic measures.  The  “Economic  Policy Package”  should  have 
been implemented earlier than June  1983 and should have provided 
greater stimulus to aggregate economic activities. Many Japanese econ- 
omists have been embarrassed by the cheaper yen rates and wish to 
see the capital outflow discouraged by the closing of the interest rate 
differential and by the appreciation of the yen rate to a level reflecting 
Japan’s “fundamentals.”  It is expected that the overall imbalance will 
be improved to generate a surplus reflecting the normal level of her 
investment-savings gap. However, Japan’s bilateral trade surplus with 
her Asian neighbors will remain, even after her overall imbalance is 
resolved. 
In spite of the  standard economic reasoning arguing that bilateral 
trade should not necessarily be balanced, the complaints of the NICs 
and ASEAN about their bilateral trade deficits with Japan will be ex- 
amined to determine the extent of their validity. The preference for 
industrial production and industrial employment cannot be denied, and 
mutual exports of industrial products are needed to satisfy this pref- 
erence. Free trade will not be maintained unless both parties are sat- 
isfied with gains from trade.  What, then, affects Japan’s imports of 
manufactures from the Asian NICs and the ASEAN countries? 
4.7  Factors Affecting Japan’s Imports of Manufactures 
In spite of the recent increases in Japan’s imports of manufactures 
from the Asian NICs, Japan is still strongly criticized abroad for im- 
porting insufficient amounts; only 11% of NICs’ manufactured exports 
and 8% of ASEAN’s manufactured exports go to Japan. It cannot be 
denied that Japan does not import enough manufactures, even after 
taking into account the smaller size of her market relative to those of 
the United States and Europe. This reflects the lack of complementarity 
in  manufacturing  production  between  Japan  and the NICs  and  the 
ASEAN countries as depicted in table 4.7. Balanced growth of man- 
ufactures trade in  this  region requires further expansion of  Japan’s 
imports of manufactures. 113  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
Why does Japan import at such a low level? Tariffs and import quotas, 
implicit import restrictions  (such as voluntary export restraints and 
administrative guidance to importers), and a complicated distribution 
channel are often mentioned, but they do not seem to be very important 
in affecting the long-run trend of imports. 
Japan’s tariffs on manufacturing have been lowered below those of 
Europe and the United States through a series of trade liberalization 
moves, i.e., the Kennedy Round Tariff Reduction (1967-72),  the Uni- 
lateral Trade Reduction (1972), and the Tokyo Round Tariff Reduction 
(1980-87).  Furthermore,  imports  under  the Generalized  System of 
Preferences (exempting 50%  100% of the duties on manufactured im- 
ports from developing countries) have increased steadily since 1971, 
and NICs and the ASEAN countries have been the major beneficiaries. 
Import  quotas on manufactures have been  almost totally abolished, 
leaving only those on raw silk, silk fabrics, and leather goods. Japan 
has not yet resorted to quota restriction of textile imports under the 
bilateral agreement of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, Article 4. 
What about voluntary export restraints and the infamous adminis- 
trative guidance to importers? Voluntary restraint was requested only 
at a private business level from exporters of a few commodities: from 
Korea and Pakistan for cotton yarns, from China for cotton fabrics, 
and from Korea for certain steel products. All of  them took place in 
cases of import surge into the Japanese market. Their import-restricting 
effect, however, was rather dubious, but the Korean Spinner’s Asso- 
ciation agreed on voluntary restraint of cotton yarn exports when a 
dumping case was brought up by its Japanese counterpart. 
An import  surveillance system and  administrative guidance were 
introduced for textiles and clothing by the government in 1973-74 after 
the import surge motivated by speculation. The former is no more than 
an early-warning system based on import contract statistics. A record 
of  all import contracts was collected from individual importers and 
circulated to all importers in order to avoid import without deficit mar- 
ket prospects. The latter is conducted by officials of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, who telephone major importers in 
order to discourage further increase of import contracts in case of an 
import surge. There were a few cases when this scheme was attempted 
to discourage an increase of imports of cotton yam, but it was not very 
effective since importation continued by minor importers. This tactic 
is  seldom attempted for imports  of  such  differentiated products  as 
fabrics and clothing, where small-lot transactions are handled by many 
traders and thus high administrative costs would be incurred. It may 
well  be concluded  that administrative guidance can prevent  import 
surges caused by speculation but not import increases caused by market 
forces. 114  Ippei Yamazawa 
Conventional import procedures and complicated distribution chan- 
nels are often referred to as barriers to penetration into the Japanese 
market by foreign exporters. The import procedure, however, will be 
improved considerably by an overall amendment of the Import Law 
proposed  in  December  1982. The complicated distribution channels 
reflect the major role of Japanese wholesalers in providing small-and 
medium-sized manufacturers with merchandizing and financing facili- 
ties. A recent MIPRO report (1983) pointed out that the distribution 
channels for impokted products are shorter and more simplified than 
those for their domestic competitors, thereby giving a competitive edge 
to importers.  Direct imports of cheap consumer manufactures  have 
been increased by department stores and supermarkets. 
The same report listed around fifty European and American firms 
which  have  succeeded  in establishing their  distribution  channels  in 
Japan either independently or in cooperation with Japanese agents. 
Moreover, the alleged “lack of acquaintance” of foreign exporters with 
the Japanese market is much less important for Korean and Taiwanese 
exporters, who have had close contact with the Japanese market. 
4.8  Structural Adjustment of  Domestic Production 
The slow expansion of Japan’s imports of manufactures has been 
affected by such structural factors as adjustment of domestic produc- 
tion, competition within the Japanese market, and the business behav- 
ior of Japanese firms. We  need to investigate how Japanese manufac- 
turing industries have been adjusting to the increased export capability 
of the NICs and ASEAN. The data in table 4.9 show the change over 
time  (1965-80)  in  export-output and self-sufficiency ratios for forty 
major industries.  The two ratios are defined as EIX  and (X - E) / 
(X + M -  E), where X, E, and M refer to domestic production, ex- 
port, and import respectively.  We  expect the two ratios to decline in 
an industry in which Japan is losing comparative advantage. 
For the manufacturing total (row 41) a slow adjustment is depicted. 
The export-output ratio increased by 4%, while the self-sufficiency ratio 
declined by 2% between 1965 and 1980. But more distinct adjustment 
is observed at less aggregated levels.  For textiles and miscellaneous 
products (rows 16-20,  22) the self-sufficiency ratio showed a greater 
decline (1096615% for natural  fiber yarn  and leather products); the 
export-output ratio also declined for many of them. Among processed 
foodstuffs (rows  10- 15), meat,  dairy, and  fishery  products  showed 
distinct declines in the two ratios, while small amounts of exports and 
high self-sufficiency continued for others. 
On  the other hand, the export-output ratios increased greatly for 
machinery  (rows 37-40),  while their self-sufficiency ratios remained 115  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
unchanged at 95-99% (except for precision instruments). For chemicals 
and metals, the self-sufficiency ratios declined slightly, and their high 
export-output ratios remained unchanged. The declining shares of the 
first two groups in total output and the increasing shares in machinery 
obscure the progress of structural adjustment when looking at the man- 
ufacturing industry as a whole. 
Primary industries except fisheries (rows 1-3,  5-9)  had insignificant 
export performance. The self-sufficiency ratios of  forestry, coal, and 
non-ferrous-metal ores declined rapidly, while those for other minerals 
had been very low from the beginning. The increased self-sufficiency 
of  livestock and the  small decline of  the  same ratio for agriculture 
reflected partly the increase in domestic prices in the two sectors, since 
the ratio is calculated on the basis of current price data. Primary pro- 
duction contributed only 8% to the total output. 
Competition has increased in textiles and miscellaneous products, 
for which both export-output and self-sufficiency ratios declined. The 
decrease in the two ratios will be more distinct when certain industrial 
activities, such as cotton yarn, fabrics, and lumber products, are dis- 
aggregated, while the two ratios will remain as high for others, such 
as synthetic fiber yarn and fabrics. This difference attributed to revived 
competitiveness in the latter industrial activities in Japan. 
The products of the textile and other consumer goods industries have 
been diversified and upgraded in the face of increased competition with 
cheap imports from Asian developing countries, and their competitive 
edge has been strengthened significantly by changes in consumption 
patterns  at home.  It  seems to be  understood  only insufficiently by 
economists that revitalization has resulted from the successful response 
of textile firms to changes in consumer taste in developed countries 
and also from the change in emphasis of firms from quantity to quality, 
and that microelectronic technology is geared well to efficient produc- 
tion of assorted items in small lots. 
A recent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade report (GATT 1983) 
criticized the current research efforts in automatic clothing production 
in  developed countries as a waste of capital and suggested that the 
same supply of clothing could be obtained through trade with devel- 
oping countries. However, the report misses the point that the constant 
change in taste and the preference for diversity are major characteristics 
of this industry. As a matter of fact, textile businessmen in developing 
countries, recognizing the current demand change in their export mar- 
kets and expecting similar changes in their domestic markets in the 
near future, have started to upgrade the quality of their products. 
However, the combined share of textile, miscellaneous products, and 
processed foodstuffs declined to 10% of the total output in 1980. The 
decline in self-sufficiency is needed in machinery and chemical-metal Table 4.9  Structural Adjustment of Japanese Industries 
Share in Total Output (%)  Export-output Ratio (%)  Self-sufficiency Ratio (%) 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1965  1970  1975  1980  1965  1970  1975  1980 
1.  Cultivation agriculture 
2.  Livestock 
3.  Forestry 
4.  Fishery 
5. coal 
6.  Iron ore 
7.  Non-ferrous-metal ore 
8. Crude petroleum and natural gas 
9.  Other nonmetallic minerals 
10.  Meat and dairy products 
11.  Fishery products 
12.  Grain, milled and flour 
13.  Other processed foods 
14.  Beverages 
15. Tobacco 
16. Natural fiber yam 
17.  Man-made fiber yam 
18.  Oabrics and other textile products 
19.  Wearing apparel 
















































































































































































































































86.6 Export-output Ratio (%)  Self-sufficiency Ratio (%)  Share in Total Output (%) 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1965  1970  1975  1980  1965  1970  1975  1980 
21.  Rubber products  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9  17.5 
22.  Miscellaneous products  2.2  2.5  2.7  3.0  19.0 
23.  Lumber and wooden products  2.7  2.6  2.1  1.8  4.0 
24.  Furniture  1.1  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.3 
25.  Printing and publishing  2.0  2.1  2.4  2.3  0.8 
26.  Pulp and paper  3.1  3.0  3.0  3.1  2.2 
27.  Basic industrial chemicals  3.7  3.3  3.8  4.3  8.5 
28.  Chemical fiber materials  1.2  1.0  0.6  0.5  14.9 
29.  Other chemical products  2.4  2.3  2.6  2.7  4.1 
30.  Petroleum products  2.8  2.7  4.9  6.0  4.0 
3  1.  Coal products  0.8  0.9  1.4  1.3  0.2 
32.  Ceramic and other nonmetallic mineral products  2.6  3.0  3.1  3.2  8.3 
33.  Pig iron and crude steel  4.3  4.9  5.2  4.4  0.3 
34.  Primary steel products  6.7  8.2  7.2  7.5  16.8 
35.  Primary non-ferrous-metal products  1.7  2.2  2.0  2.5  6.8 
36.  Other metal products  3.6  4.2  3.9  3.8  7.9 
37.  Industrial machinery  6.7  9.4  8.5  8.1  8.3 
38.  Electrical machinery  5.9  8.6  6.7  8.7  12.7 
39.  Transport equipment  7.7  8.6  9.5  10.2  15.7 
40.  Precision instruments  1.2  1.3  1.0  1.3  19.5 
41.  Manufacturing total (rows 10-40)  86.9  91.1  90.9  92.8  8.7 













































16.5  99.5 
8.7  97.0 
0.8  98.5 
1.3  99.9 
0.6  99.2 
2.7  97.3 
8.4  94.6 
25.7  99.6 
9.4  93.1 
2.4  89.8 
1.4  99.8 
6.3  99.4 
0.2  94.3 
17.9  99.9 
11.4  85.1 
10.2  99.3 
19.4  95.0 
23.0  97.2 
30.3  97.1 
38.4  93.5 
12.3  96.5 



































































Source: Compiled by Takeshi Suzuki with data from the Economic Planning Agency. 
Note: The two ratios are defined as follows. The export-output ratio and self-sufficiency ratio are defined as E/X and (X ~  E)/(X + M - 0,  where X, E, and M refer to 
domestic output, exports, and imports respectively. 118  Ippei Yamazawa 
groups in order to increase Japan’s import of manufactures. Although 
Japan still retains international competitiveness in these activities, the 
NICs have been promoting domestic production  and export of these 
products, and  they  have  a competitive edge in  the labor-intensive, 
standardized portions of the production process. 
It is typical for Japanese firms to procure some parts and intermediate 
inputs from affiliated suppliers within Japan. This type of firm behavior 
has been fostered for a long time by Japan’s import substitution strategy 
to offset her persistent balance-of-payments deficits in her development 
process. It is also related to the well-developed system of subcontract- 
ing and the high technology and skill level of subcontracting firms. If, 
however, they modify their policy and extend their procurement sources 
to include their Asian neighbors, intraregional trade in parts and in- 
termediate products will in the long run be as prevalent between Japan 
and the NICs as it is between the countries of Western Europe. 
Japan’s Asian  neighbors  need  improved  skills and  technology  to 
promote intraregional trade in both consumer goods and intermediate 
products. 
4.9  Toward a Harmonious Division of Labor 
Many Japanese economists welcome the catching up of NICs and 
ASEAN  countries  in  various  sectors  of  industrial  activities.  These 
countries have the highest potential for growth in the world, and Japan 
must cooperate  with them for mutual prosperity.  These economists 
recognize the need for promoting industrial development in the region 
at the cost of increasing competition with some Japanese sectors. There 
are of course strong objections from businessmen in import-competing 
sectors, and their demand for protection has increased recently. How- 
ever, the Japanese government maintains a free trading position, and 
Japan has remained the last major developed country refraining from 
a policy of  restraining textile imports under the MFA. Its industrial 
policies for adjustment assistance to the manufacturing sector are gen- 
erally consistent with the idea of positive adjustment policies. 
The promotion of industrial cooperation, however, should be con- 
sistent with the market forces and initiatives of private enterprises and 
individuals. The government can arrange a favorable atmosphere for 
technical transfer and upgrading of skills only through a joint venture 
with the private sector. An increasing number of Japanese businessmen 
have been regarding the East and Southeast Asia as an integrated area 
to which the supply of their parts and intermediate inputs may freely 
be relocated from the “traditional”  domestic sources. But there still 
remains room for host governments to improve their rules and regu- 
lations that have been discouraging these private business activities 
beyond the national borders of Japan. 119  Japan and Her Asian Neighbors in a Dynamic Perspective 
The promotion of a harmonious division of labor between Japan and 
her Asian neighbors requires modification of conventional governmen- 
tal and firm behavior on both sides. 
Notes 
1. The first five sections of this paper are based on the joint research of the 
author and two of  his  colleagues.  For details of the analysis and statistical 
information, refer to Yamazawa, Hirata, and Taniguchi 1983. 
2. These figures are obtained from the original inverse matrix of the twenty- 
four-sector 1-0 table in Institute of Developing Economies 1982. 
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